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ARGUMENT
A. Setting aside default and denial of motion for default judgment.
Northern Utah Healthcare Corporation dba St. Mark’s Hospital (“St.
Mark’s”) was served in May 2007 with a Notice of Intention to Commence
an Action by Roth. [R336] St. Mark’s through its attorneys stipulated that a
proceeding before the Department of Occupational and Professional
Licensing (“DOPL”) would serve no purpose [R68] which provided for a
certificate of compliance to be issued by DOPL so that Roth could file his
lawsuit. [R336] On March 31, 2008 St. Mark’s attorneys received the
Summons and Complaint dated January 17, 2008. [R68] (Emphasis
added) The Summons on its face stated that an answer was due within 30
days of service. [R28].

The only reason given for the failure to file an

answer to the Summons and Complaint was a non-attorney in the attorneys
office incorrectly calendared the due date at 45 days. [R68 and 76-77].
There is no dispute that St. Mark’s did not file a timely answer. [See page 6
of St. Mark’s Brief acknowledging the due date to answer as April 24, 2008
and they did not file until May 9, 2008].
St. Mark’s opens its Argument at page 19 of its Appellee Brief
arguing that a trial court is endowed considerable discretion in granting

or denying motions to set aside a default. Roth agrees. St. Mark’s cites
some cases, mainly federal cases that make relief from a default easier to
obtain than relief from a default judgment and argues that it would be an
abuse of the court in not granting relief in a case like the one before this
Court based upon this less stringent requirement for granting relief.
However, this is contrary to the Utah Supreme Court decision cited in
Roth’s Brief at pg 22, concluding that Rule 60(b) criteria are applicable to
demonstrate “good cause” under Rule 55(c), See Gold Standard, Inc. v.
American Barrick Resources Corp., 805 P.2d 164, 168 (Utah 1990) and does
not square with a recent decision of this Court. In Davis v. Goldsworthy,
184 P.3d 626 (Utah Ct. App. 2008) in a case involving a default, like St.
Mark’s claim in this case, Goldsworthy’s theory was essentially one of
excusable neglect. This Court in Davis v. Goldsworthy, at 630 id. “To
demonstrate that the default was due to excusable neglect, ‘[t]he movant
must show that he has used due diligence and that he was prevented from
appearing by circumstances over which he had no control.’” Citing Black’s
Title, Inc., 1999 UT App. 330, ¶10, 991 P.2d 607 (quoting Airkem
Intermountain, Inc. v. Parker, 513 P.2d 429, 431 (1973). “Absent such a
showing, [a defaulting party[‘s assertion does not demonstrate his neglect
was excusable.” Id.
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All that the Trial Court had to go on was that the answer was not filed
by the deadline and that the only excuse was that a non-attorney staff
member for HPS calendared the response date at 45 instead of the required
30 days. There was absolutely no requisite showing of due diligence after
the attorneys received the summons and complaint and no showing or even
suggestion of any kind that HPS was prevented from appearing by
circumstances over which they had no control.
This Court should follow its own precedence as it declared under
similar circumstances in Davis v. Goldsworthy, at 630, id. “reverse and
remand to the trial court for the detailed findings required by Utah case law
and for such orders as may then be appropriate.”
B. Discovery of legal injury through due diligence.

Dr. Joseph appears to argue that the burden is on Roth to overcome
the trial court’s determination that he discovered his legal injury on October
13, 2004 or at least by January 5, 2005. However, this burden is and has
been Dr. Joseph’s to establish. See Conder v. Hunt, 2000 UT App 105, ¶ 14,
1 P.3d 558, cert. denied, 9 P.3d 170 (Utah 2000). ¶ 14 "As with any
affirmative defense, defendants have the burden of proving every element
necessary to establish that the statute of limitations bars [plaintiff's] claim."
Seale v. Gowans, 923 P.2d 1361, 1363 (Utah 1996). See Stewart v. K & S
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Co., 591 P.2d 433, 435 (Utah 1979); Slayden v. Sixta, 250 Kan. 23, 825
P.2d 119, 122 (1992) (stating "the burden of pleading and proving" statute of
limitation's applicability "rests on the defendant").
Dr. Joseph argues that since Roth obtained his medical records on
January 5, 2005 the statute of limitations was triggered by at least this date if
not the earlier date of October 13, 2004 when Roth admittedly learned of his
physical injury. It appears from Dr. Joseph’s argument that he is claiming
that Roth learned of his legal injury on October 13, 2004 when he discovered that the polypectomy site was not removed during surgery.
However, all this establishes is that Roth learned of his physical injury, but
in no way equates to his discovery of his legal injury. The statute of limitations that Dr. Joseph is seeking to invoke is U.C.A. §78B-3-404(1). It
provides “…malpractice action… shall be commenced within two years
after…patient discovers,…the injury…” “Injury” (legal injury) is defined as
discovery of injury and the negligence that caused the injury. Foil v.
Ballinger, 601 P.2d 144, 148-9 (Utah 1979). As for obtaining medical records on January 5, 2005, it is an incredulous claim that this established the
day Roth knew of his legal injury. This would be like handing someone
who does not know Arabic the Quran written in Arabic and then claiming
that as of that date they were aware of the teachings of Muhammad.
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The law in Utah is clear that in order to invoke the statute of limitations in this case, short of Dr. Joseph delineating some definitive event or
date that clearly demonstrates Roth learned of his legal injury, it is for the
jury to conclude when this occurred or should have occurred through due diligence. The Utah Supreme Court in a recent case, Daniels v. Gamma West
Brachytherapy, 2009 UT 66, ¶31, 221 P.3d 256 (2009) declared,
Tying the statute of limitations’ trigger to the discovery
of the cause-in-fact of a patient’s injury does not leave
health care professionals endlessly susceptible to revived
claims. Instead, the discovery rule is tempered by a
requirement that a patient act with reasonable diligence in
investigating a suspected injury. Thus, the statute of
limitations begins when exercising such diligence a patient
should have discovered his injury and its possible negligent
cause. Whether and when a patient should have discovered
an injury and its cause is a fact intensive question that
requires a jury to determine, given the information available,
whether the actions taken in response to an injury and the
efforts extended to discover its cause were adequate.
The one record in these voluminous medical records that Dr. Joseph is
“hanging his hat on” is an obscure office note of Dr. Voorhees in June 2004.
By itself it does not really shed light on any determination that a negligent
act occurred. At best it may lead one to further inquiry as to its meaning.
That is exactly what Roth proceeded to do. He made inquiry through the
depositions of Dr. Joseph and Dr. Voorhees in January 2007 as to the
meaning of problems involving the tattoo ink.
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In this case it is for the jury to determine when Roth through due diligence should have discovered his legal injury. As we learned from the
Daniels v. Gamma West Brachytherapy, case at ¶31, in order for the jury to
make this determination they also need to know “….which event it is evaluating for whether the plaintiff was aware or should have been aware of what
was the negligent cause of his injury.” Roth on October 13, 2004 was led
by Dr. Joseph to believe that the surgeon was responsible [R236 ¶19] causing Roth to concentrate on this causal event, the May 24, 2004 surgery, and
not look at Dr. Joseph’s April 28, 2004 treatment.
C. Discovery of Legal injury – Issue Preclusion
Dr. Joseph argues issue preclusion based upon Judge Lindberg’s
ruling in the Roth v. Pedersen, 2009 UT App. 313 (unpublished) (attached
hereto in the Appendix). The trial court dismissed this case based upon its
determination that Roth discovered his legal injury on October 13, 2004 and
therefore his filing his statutory notice to commence an action and suit in
2008 was more than two years from this date and therefore the statute of
limitations had run. This Court affirmed the dismissal; however, upon
different grounds than applied by the Trial Court. This Court rejected the
determination that Roth discovered his legal injury on October 13, 2004 and
instead determined that by at least the time he initiated a malpractice action
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against the surgeon he had discovered his legal injury, some nineteen
months later. See Roth v. Pedersen, pg 3 of this Court’s unpublished
Memorandum Decision (Appendix). In order to use issue preclusion to
establish that Roth discovered his legal injury on October 13, 2004, such
prior position must have been successful, and in the prior case it was not.
See 3D Constr. & Dev., L.L.C. v. Old Standard Life Ins. Co., 2005 UT App
307, ¶11, 117 P.3d 1082, 1085-86 "Under judicial estoppel, 'a person may
not, to the prejudice of another person, deny any position taken in a prior
judicial proceeding between the same persons or their privies involving the
same subject matter, if such prior position was successfully maintained.' "
Nebeker v. State Tax Comm'n, 2001 UT 74,¶ 26, 34 P.3d 180 (quoting
Tracy Loan & Trust Co. v. Openshaw Inv. Co., 102 Utah 509, 132 P.2d 388,
390 (1942)).
Furthermore, Dr. Joseph in his Brief at page 28 sets forth the criteria
that must be met before issue preclusion is applied, citing Oman v. Davis
School District, 2008 UT 70, ¶29, 194 P.3d 956.
(i) the party against whom issue preclusion is asserted must have been
a party to or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication; (ii) the issue
decided in the prior adjudication must be identical to the one presented in
the instant action; (iii) the issue in the first action must have been
completely, fully, and fairly litigated; and (iv) the first suit must have
resulted in a final judgment on the merits.
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Roth is the party in both suits for which Dr. Joseph seeks issue
preclusion, so element (i) is met and the memorandum decision in the prior
appeal "resulted in a final judgment on the merits." See State v. Baker, 176
P.3d 493, 496 (Utah App. 2008); thus, element (ii) is met. The litigation
however, was never completely and fully litigated in that there was no
hearings conducted, there was no evidence provided to the Court, and in this
jury case no jury was impaneled. Thus element (iii) was not met and as for
element (ii) the issue decided is not identical to the issue in the matter at
hand. Dr. Pedersen was sued for alleged malpractice that occurred in a
surgical procedure on May 24, 2004; whereas, Dr. Joseph is being sued for
medical malpractice related to his treatment in a separate causal event in
April 2004.
Not withstanding the foregoing argument, the final decision on the
merits in Roth v. Pedersen, pg. 3, id., concluded that Roth discovered his
legal injury by May 2006 and as such the statute of limitations in this case
would have similarly run in May 2008, some four months after Roth filed
suit against Dr. Joseph and St. Mark’s.
D. Concealment
Where the June 8, 2004 letter from Dr. Voorhees to Dr. Joseph plays a
significant role in this case is that it represents information that Dr. Joseph

8

had a duty to disclose to Roth after receipt of the letter from Dr. Voorhees.
Dr. Joseph was absolutely required to inform Roth that he was experiencing
problems with the SPOT ink used to tattoo Roth’s polypectomy site and that
it was likely Dr. Voorhees failed to remove this cancerous site in the May
24, 2004 surgery, which information was critical for Roth in determining
how to proceed in protecting his body. A doctor does have a common law
fiduciary duty “to disclose to his patient any material information
concerning the patient’s physical condition.” Nixdorf v. Hicken, 612 P.2d
348, 354 (Utah 1980). See Daniels, 2009 UT 66, ¶51. The question of what
is “material information” is for the jury.

Nixdorf v. Hicken at 354, id.

Roth testified in his affidavit herein, that the first he became aware of
the June 8, 2004 letter from Dr. Voorhees to Dr. Joseph was during the
deposition of Dr. Joseph in 2007. The fact this letter was not in Dr. Joseph’s
medical records certainly raises a question for the jury as to why Dr. Joseph
concealed this letter from Roth. This certainly raises a material issue of fact.
Dr. Joseph argues that Roth’s argument of fraudulent concealment is
baseless and Roth was required to prove that Dr. Joseph affirmatively acted
to conceal. The law is clear in Utah that a doctor has a duty to disclose to
his patient material medical information. Nixdorf v. Hicken, at 354 id.

9

The Court in Charlesworth v. Reyns, 113 P.3d 1031, 1037 (UT App. 2005)
stated, “A fiduciary's breach of the 'duty to speak the truth' is sufficient to
establish fraudulent concealment. Russell/Packard Dev., Inc. v. Carson, 78
P.3d 616, aff'd as to result, 108 P.3d 741, 752 (quoting Chapman v. Primary
Children's Hosp., 784 P.2d 1181, 1186 (Utah 1989)).
Dr. Joseph states that where fraudulent concealment is alleged the
circumstances forming the basis of the allegation must be stated with
particularity. Roth has stated acts of fraudulent concealment with
particularity. Roth pointed to Dr. Joseph’s knowledge of the problems the
surgeon experienced in the botched surgery, that it related to his failure to
properly tattoo the polypectomy site, his failure to disclose his
miscommunication to the surgeon as to the location of the polypectomy site
and his failure to disclose to Roth that the surgeon asked Dr. Joseph to
promptly perform a colonoscopy in order to determine if the polypectomy
site had been removed as he was concerned that it might not have been.
[R1-8]. Dr. Joseph much like the defendant Dr. Veasy in Chapman v.
Primary Children’s Hospital, 784 P.2d 1181 (Utah 1989), misdirected Roth
away from looking at him for malpractice [R236 ¶19] and although aware
of critical medical information that he was required and had a duty to
disclose to Roth, he remained silent (concealment). “In this case, however,
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the Chapmans' complaint, though drafted in an admittedly ‘scattershot’
fashion, contains the averments that defendants withheld information
regarding the cause of Jennifer's injuries and ‘misinformed [the Chapmans]
by, among other things, advising them that the brain damage sustained by
Jennifer Chapman was an unavoidable event which was not caused by any
misconduct on the part of any of the defendants.’ This is a sufficiently clear
and specific description of the facts underlying the Chapmans' claim of
fraudulent concealment to support our conclusion that the requirement of
rule 9(b) has been met. See Peteler v. Robison, 81 Utah 535, 553, 17 P.2d
244, 250 (1932).” Roth respectfully submits that he has as well made
sufficiently clear and specific description of the facts underlying his claim of
fraudulent concealment to support a conclusion that the requirement of Rule
9(b) has been met.
CONCLUSION
The Trial Court did not make the requisite findings to support St.
Mark’s request for relief for excusable neglect, specifically no findings were
made and interestingly nothing was provided by St. Mark’s showing due
diligence and that it was prevented from appearing by circumstances over
which it had no control. This Court should reverse the Trial Court’s setting
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aside the Default Certificate and remand for the detailed findings required by
Utah case law and for such orders as may then be appropriate.
The Order granting Summary Judgment must be reversed as genuine
issues of material fact exist as to when Roth discovered or through due
diligence should have discovered his legal injury. Specifically there is
actually no date provided in the Record that establishes Roth’s discovery of
both the causal event and the negligence which caused his physical injury.
As to when he should have through due diligence discovered the causal
event and the negligence is a fact intensive matter for the jury to determine.
The Order granting Summary Judgment must be reversed as a genuine issue
of material fact exists as to whether Roth was prevented from discovering
his legal injury because of the alleged fraudulent concealment of Dr. Joseph.
Issue preclusion is inapplicable in this case and does not support the
summary judgment entered herein.
For these reasons, this Court should reverse and remand on the
granting of Rule 60(b) relief to St. Mark’s and allow the Trial Court to make
such findings under Utah law as to whether or not St. Mark’s can
demonstrate that their failure to timely file an answer to the Complaint was
due to excusable neglect. This Court should reverse the Summary Judgment
entered in favor of the defendants and allow a jury to decide when Roth
discovered the causal event and negligence that caused his injury and/or
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determine whether there was fraudulent concealment in order for the Trial
Court to then be able to determine whether the statute of limitations ran or
had not run in this case.
DATED this 24th day of March 2010.

_____________________________

David E. Ross II
Attorney for Appellant
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APPENDIX
Roth v. Pedersen, 2009 UT App. 313.
Entered October 29, 2009, as an unpublished Memorandum Decision
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